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Abstract 
There is a growing interest in extending project evaluation methods to the 
evaluation of programs: complex interventions involving multiple activities. In 
general a program evaluation cannot be based on separate evaluations of its 
components since interactions between the activities are likely to be important. 
We propose a measure of program impact, the total program effect (TPE), 
which is an extension of the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET). 
Regression techniques can be applied to observational data from a 
representative sample to estimate the TPE for complex interventions in the 
presence of selection effects and treatment heterogeneity. As an example we 
present an estimate of the TPE for a rural water supply and sanitation program 
in Mozambique.   
Estimating the TPE from randomized controlled trials would appear to be an 
alternative; however, the scope for using RCTs in this context is limited.  
 
 
JEL Codes: C21, C33, O22 
keywords: program evaluation; randomized controlled trials; policy evaluation; treatment 
heterogeneity; budget support; sector-wide programs; aid effectiveness  
  
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Remco Oostendorp, Menno Pradhan, Martin Ravallion, Finn Tarp and seminar participants in 
Amsterdam, Duisburg-Essen, Namur, Oxford and Paris for comments on previous versions. 
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Evaluation of Development Programs: 
Using Regressions to Assess the Impact of Complex Interventions 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Experimental techniques for impact evaluation presuppose that the intervention is well-defined: 
the “project” is limited in space and scope (e.g. Duflo et al., 2008). However, governments, 
NGOs and donor agencies are often interested in evaluating the effect of a program consisting of 
heterogeneous interventions such as sector-wide health or education programs (De Kemp et al., 
2011). Program evaluation faces two complications. First, a dichotomous distinction between 
treatment and control groups is usually impossible. For example, a program in the education 
sector may involve activities such as school building, teacher training and supply of textbooks. 
Typically all communities are affected in some way by the program, but they may differ 
dramatically in what interventions they are exposed to and the extent of that exposure. Secondly, 
in a program the interventions are typically implemented at various administrative levels so that 
the policy maker has only imperfect control over actual treatment.  
  
The impact of such a program cannot simply be calculated on the basis of the results of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). This would run into well known problems of external 
validity (Bracht and Glass, 1968, Rodrik, 2008, Ravallion, 2009, Banerjee and Duflo, 2009, 
Deaton, 2010, Imbens, 2010) even if the program involved only a single intervention. In 
addition, if the program involves multiple interventions and interactions are important then it is 
not even clear how to assess the overall impact of the program, even if individual components of 
the program have all been evaluated by means of RCTs. We will argue, however, that regression 
techniques can be used for evaluation in a sector-wide context. This involves drawing a 
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representative sample of beneficiaries (e.g. households, schools, communities) and collecting 
data on the combination of interventions experienced by each beneficiary together with other 
possible determinants of the outcome variables of interest. Regression techniques can then be 
used to estimate the impact of the various interventions.2 In this paper we generalize this 
approach by allowing for treatment heterogeneity and propose an estimate of aggregate program 
impact.  
 
Clearly, the intervention variables included in the regression as explanatory variables may be 
endogenous. For example, an unobserved variable such as the political preferences of the 
community may affect both the impact variable of interest and the intervention. In addition, the 
impact of the intervention may differ across beneficiaries and the allocation of interventions 
across beneficiaries may in part be based on such treatment heterogeneity, either through self-
selection or through the allocation decisions of program officials. In either case the intervention 
variables would be endogenous. We will argue that to the extent that endogeneity is the result of 
treatment heterogeneity  (“selection on the gain”, Heckman, 1997, Heckman et al., 2008) one 
should not correct for it since the resulting selection bias is part of the program impact.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we propose a measure of 
program impact, the total program effect (TPE), which extends the average treatment effect on 
the treated (ATET). We then consider two complications: correlation between program variables 
and the controls in section 3 and spillover effects in section 4. In section 5 we investigate 
whether estimating the TPE using RCTs is an alternative. The scope for RCTs is limited, 
notably when in the program assignment is imperfectly controlled and correlated with 
unobservables. We illustrate the approach in Section 6 by estimating the TPE for a program in 
Mozambique involving water supply and sanitation training interventions. Section 7 concludes. 
                                                 
2 This approach is discussed in White (2006) and Elbers et al. (2009).  
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2. The Total Program Effect (TPE) 
 
Consider the following model:  
  ( ) ( )it it i it i ity f X g P       (1) 
where y measures an outcome of interest, in this paper taken to be a scalar; t = 0, 1 is the time of 
measurement; and 1,...,i n  denotes the unit of observation (e.g. households or locations). P 
denotes a vector of the interventions to be evaluated and X a vector of observed controls.3 The 
P-variables can either be binary variables or multi-valued (discrete or continuous) variables. i  
represents the combined effects of unobserved characteristics (assumed to be time invariant for 
simplicity) and it  is the error term, assumed to be independent over time.  We also assume that 
the interventions and control variables are uncorrelated with the error process: 
1 0 1 0 1 0, , , , .i i i i i iX X P P    
At this stage we also assume that P and X are independent: 
1 0 1 0, , .i i i iX X P P  
This will be relaxed in section 3. Note that equation (1) excludes spillover effects of the type 
where ity  depends on  ( )jtP i j and j is not necessarily included in the sample. This point will 
be discussed in Section 4. In many cases (1) will represent a reduced form or “black box” 
regression but it can also represent a structural model. 
 
                                                 
3 Whether P reflects an intention to treat or actual “treatment” depends on the context of the evaluation but the 
analysis applies to both cases.  
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Our interest is in the expectation (in the population) of the effect of interventions on the outcome 
variable. This is the expected difference 1 0( ( ) ( ))i i i iE g P g P  which we will call the total 
program effect (TPE):4 
1 0TPE ( ( ) ( )).i i i iE g P g P   
Note that we do not impose a common function g: we allow for heterogeneity of program 
impact.  
 
As an example consider a very simple special case: 
                0,1it t i it i ity P t         (2) 
where itP  now is a binary variable rather than a vector and 0 0 for all .iP i Taking first 
differences gives: 
      1 1 1i i i iy P          
 
where 1 0.    This is analogous to the equation for a standard project evaluation, but 
written in differences.5 The TPE for this case equals 1i iE P  which is related to the familiar 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET)  
 
1
TPEATET = .
iEP  
 
In equation (1) the terms involving the interventions and the control variables are additively 
separable. This allows the following identification strategy for the TPE. Assume that we have 
data from a random sample and that for a subsample (the “control group”) there is no change in 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking this is the total effect of changes in the program. We use the symbol E for population averages 
and a bar over a variable for sample averages.  
5 This assumes that the autonomous trend α = α1 - α0 is the same for all subjects (or, alternatively that the difference 
it  is exogenous and can be treated as part of the residual). In the terminology of double differencing this is the 
assumption of parallel trends. If this assumption is questionable then data for more periods are needed to estimate 
how trends depend on P. In this paper we abstract from this complication and limit the analysis to two periods. The 
extension to more periods is non-trivial but conceptually straightforward.     
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the interventions: 1 0.i iP P  (At this stage we do not assume that the assignment to intended 
“treatment” and “control” groups is random.) Taking first differences in (1) for this group gives: 
( ) .it it ity f X       
This allows us to estimate 1 0ˆ ˆ( ) ( )i if X f X , so that the TPE can be estimated as 
   ˆ( ) ( ).it it itg P y f X     
In the context we have in mind (a program consisting of multiple interventions) there will 
usually not be a sufficiently large control group to make this identification strategy realistic. 
Indeed, typically the control group will be empty: all i will have experienced a change in at least 
some components of the vector .itP    
 
For the more general case we need to make a strong assumption on the functional form of 
( ).f X We will assume linearity (and suppress the subscript t when taking differences between 
the two periods considered): 
( ) .it itf X X   
Substituting this in (1) and using a first order Taylor expansion for g(P) gives  
* * *
*
( ) ( )( )it it i i P i i it i i it
it i it i it
y X g P g P P P
X P
  
   
     
      
so that, approximately6 
.i i i i iy X P               (3) 
In this case  
TPE .i iE P          (4) 
Note that the TPE is a weighted sum of the i  parameters where the actual distribution of 
interventions provides the weights.7  
                                                 
6 In an earlier version of this paper, Elbers and Gunning (2009), we derived this equation under much more 
restrictive conditions.  
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In general the parameters i  will be correlated with the P and X variables.  
Equation (3) can be rewritten as 
( | , ) .i i i i i i iy X E X P P                
Here ( ( | , ))i i i i i i iE X P P           and this is uncorrelated with and i iX P  . 
The term ( | , )i i iE X P   can be approximated linearly:8  
  0 1 2( | , ) .i i i i iE X P X P           
Substitution in (4) and collecting terms gives 
 1 2 3 4i i i i i i i iy X P X P P P                         (5) 
 
where 2 3 4i i i i iP X P P P         is the approximation of ( | , ).i i i i iT E P X P      
Equation (5) can be estimated using the sample data. The estimated coefficients can then be used 
to estimate iT  as  
2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi i i i i iT P X P P P             
The TPE can now be estimated as the average of iˆT  in the sample.  
2 3 4
1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆi i i i i i
i
TPE T P X P P P
n
                   (6) 
where bars denote sample averages. 
 
In practice this means that one regresses iy  on iX , iP  and their interactions with iP  and 
collects all terms involving iP  to calculate the total program effect. Note that the estimated 
TPE is linear in the ˆ parameters so that its standard error can be obtained straightforwardly 
from the covariance matrix of the OLS-coefficients. 
                                                                                                                                                            
7 Note that in equation (3) *( )i P i ig P   . Interactions of program components are therefore one reason for 
treatment heterogeneity.  
8 Higher order approximations would not change the argument. 
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It is instructive to return to the special case of equation (2) where iP  is a binary variable. In 
differences:  
   i i i iy P         
In this case the quadratic approximation of ( | )i iE y P   is exact (and in fact linear): 
0 1( | ) (1 ) ( | 0) ( | 1)i i i i i i i i iE P P P E P PE P               
Substitution in the regression equation gives 
( | ) ( | 1)i i i i iE y P E P P             (7) 
so that an OLS regression of  on i iy P   gives an unbiased estimate of the ( | 1)i iE P   .  
 
When can RCTs be used to estimate the TPE? 
  
In level form (3) can be written as 
*
it it i it i ity X P              
This equation allows for two types of selection effects: itP  may be correlated with i  or with 
the unobserved characteristics *i . A correlation of  itP  and *i  is dealt with by differencing, as 
in (3).9  However, the TPE measures the effect of the program inclusive of selectivity in the 
assignment of program interventions resulting in a correlation of i  and iP . This is appropriate 
since the way the program was assigned (in an ex post evaluation) or will be assigned (in an ex 
ante evaluation) is one of its characteristics. If the program was successful in part because 
program officers made sure the program interventions were assigned to households or locations 
where they expected a high impact, then the evaluation should reflect this. In fact the evaluation 
would be misleading if it tried to “correct” for such selection effects by presenting (if this were 
feasible) an estimate ( iE ) of the program’s impact if it had been assigned randomly.  
                                                 
9 Differencing is sufficient because of our assumption of parallel trends (cf. footnote 5).    
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Recall from (4) that in the linear case 
TPE .i iE P   
Clearly, if iP  and i are independent this simplifies to  
TPE . .i iE E P          (8) 
Under these assumptions iE  is also the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) which 
in much of the project evaluation literature is the parameter of interest.10 In this case the TPE 
can be estimated on the basis of an RCT, using (8): the trial would give an estimate of iE  and 
administrative or sample data could be used to estimate .iP  Note that (8) can be used in two 
special cases. The first case is that of treatment homogeneity ( for all i i  ), the second one 
that of universal treatment ( 1 for all iP i ).11  
 
When iP  and i are not independent the ATET as established by an RCT is not a relevant 
parameter and estimating the TPE on the basis of RCTs can become problematic. We return to 
this issue in section 5.   
 
3. Correlation between P and X 
 
In the previous section we assumed P and X to be independent. (P, X) correlations are often 
important in evaluations. For example, changes in teacher training may induce changes in 
parental input. 1213 Not all such inputs will be observed (e.g. additional parental help with 
                                                 
10 But note that in project evaluations the policy variable is usually a binary variable. 
11 Imbens (2010) describes a reduction in class size in all California schools. This is an example of universal 
treatment.  
12 Deaton (2010) gives the example where random assignments made by the central government (e.g. the Ministry 
of Education) are partly offset by induced changes in allocations by local or provincial governments.  Ravallion 
(2012) gives a similar example and Chen et al. (2009) quantify such a spillover effect in China. Similarly, the 
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homework will probably not be recorded); itP  will then be correlated with i  and this we have 
already considered in the previous section. Conversely, if the parental input is observed then itP  
will be correlated with itX . In that case the TPE identifies the direct effect of P, but not its total 
effect (including the indirect effect through induced changes in X). If the induced effect is to be 
included then the affected components of iX  should be omitted from the regression (5).  
 
If causality is in the reverse direction, from iX  to iP , then there is no need to amend the 
section 2 estimate of the TPE since there is no induced change in .iX  (The asymmetry arises 
because in either case we are interested in the impact of changes in iP , rather than  in the 
impact of changes in iX .) 
 
In the general case where the direction of causality is not known it will usually not be possible 
to estimate the indirect effect of the program. Occasionally, however, appropriate instruments 
can be found so that the impact of iP  on iX  can be identified.  
 
4. Spillover effects 
 
Recall that in Section 2 we excluded spillover effects: in equation (1) iy  of case i does not 
depend on jP  of case j. In evaluations there are two important situations where this assumption 
is untenable. First, Chen et al. (2009) and Deaton (2010) discuss the possibility that policy in 
control villages is partly determined by policies in treatment villages so that the SUTVA (stable 
unit treatment value assumption) is violated. Indeed, if policies thus affected are not represented 
                                                                                                                                                            
political economy may be such that the central government is unable to prevent allocations being diverted to 
favored ethnic or political groups. In either case Pi might be correlated with βi.  
13 This is similar to the case considered by Das et al. (2004, 2007) where teacher absenteeism as a result of 
HIV/AIDS induces greater parental input.  
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in the policy vector iP  this creates a classical case of omitted variable bias. In Chen et al. the 
problem arises because the data record participation in a particular program as a binary iP  
variable, while other programs which may affect the outcome are initially ignored. In the 
approach advocated in the present paper all potentially relevant programs would in principle be 
included in iP  so that the problem of SUTVA violation is avoided.
14 Secondly, policies in 
village j may affect outcomes in village i. For example, a program aimed at an infectious disease 
in village j may affect health outcomes in the “untreated” village i.15  If the external effects of 
policy are general equilibrium effects such as regional wage increases, it will be hard to identify 
the full impact of a policy. But often more structure can be imposed, e.g. by including a proxy 
for relevant policies in neighboring villages in the outcome regression, so that equation (3) is 
extended to 
 .i i i i i iy P X K            
 
where iK is the proxy for policy changes in the neighborhood. If there is sufficient variation in 
iK  then   is identified in this regression. The TPE would be .i i iE P E K      
 
5. Regression Methods and RCTs Compared 
 
In section 2 we showed how the TPE can be estimated using regression methods (double 
differencing). A natural question is whether the TPE can also be estimated using RCTs.  In the 
Introduction we noted that using RCTs may be difficult, e.g. because in programs the dichotomy 
of  treatment and control groups typically breaks down.  However, there may be problems even 
in the case of binary treatments, namely under treatment heterogeneity when the probability of 
treatment is correlated with the individual impact parameters i and unknown to the evaluator. 
                                                 
14 Recall that our approach does not involve a distinction between treatment and control groups: most if not all 
subjects  receive some treatment. 
15 This has implications for sampling: since data on policies in neighboring villages are required one must sample 
groups (possibly pairs) of adjacent villages. 
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If this correlation arises through self-selection there is no problem. If the correlation arises 
because the policy maker targets on observables then an RCT would have to mimic this 
assignment, possibly by stratifying the sample on the basis of the targeting variables.  
 
But in many government and NGO programs the “policy maker” does not directly control the P 
variables: assignment is decided by lower level staff (“program officers”) on the basis of private 
information, variables that cannot be observed by the policy maker or the evaluator.  In this case 
an RCT can still identify the TPE, but at the cost of having to randomize at a higher level than 
the treatment under consideration: randomization would apply to program officers rather than 
beneficiaries. This implies that the power of the statistical analysis may be reduced.  It also 
involves losing the direct link with the intervention. 
 
This may be illustrated with an example. Consider the following model  
 i i i iy P      
where i  and i  are independent, iP  is binary and 0iE  . For simplicity we will consider i  
as intention-to-treat impact, so that a subject i ’s refusal to undergo offered treatment iP  is 
reflected in i , rather than in iP . Program implementation involves program officers who have 
imperfect knowledge of i : they perceive i i i     and will assign treatment if and only if
0i  . We further assume that i  has mean zero and is independent of i  and i . Crucially, 
this knowledge of program implementers is unknown to the evaluator. Denote the CDF of i  by
F . With this assignment rule iP  is exogenous (i.e. independent of ij ). 
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An RCT evaluation might involve drawing a random sample from the population and within this 
sample assign treatment randomly. The researcher would then estimate the program’s intention 
to treat effect (ITE) as iE .  The TPE would be estimated as i iE EP . 
 
This would be incorrect since, under the assumptions made above we have  
  
 TPE = ( | 0  ) { 0} [(1 ) .( ) ]i i i i i i i i i i iE P E P E F EPE                 
 
(Note that (1 ( )) { 0}i i i iE F P EP        . As before, the ATET = TPE / iEP .) The problem 
arises because in this case the RCT design does not mimic the actual assignment process. To 
obtain an unbiased estimate of the TPE randomization would have to take place at a higher level, 
that of the program officers.16 The control group then consist of program officers who never 
“treat” and the treatment group of program officers who sometimes (but not always) treat.  
 
 The regression method we propose would  lead to an unbiased estimator of the TPE using 
observational data for ( , )i iy P from a random sample of the population, as shown in (7). The 
difference is that while the RCT approach compares average outcomes at the level of program 
officers the regression approach does so at the level of beneficiaries. The RCT approach 
therefore has lower statistical power.17  
 
Moving beyond the example there is a more fundamental objection to the RCT approach if 
outcomes depend not only on P but also on X, as in (1). If the RCT involved randomization over 
actual program officers then it is unlikely that randomization can also be achieved in terms of all 
                                                 
16 Duflo et al. (2008, pp. 3935-37) make this point in a similar context (partial compliance) concluding that “One 
must compare all those initially allocated to the treatment group to all those initially randomized to the comparison 
group”.     
17 This is shown in the Supplemental Material. 
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the confounding X variables since program officers will not have been posted randomly across 
space. This introduces a correlation between X and characteristics of the program officers and 
hence a correlation between P and X. The two groups of program officers (“treatment” and 
“control”) will therefore differ systematically so that internal validity is  lost. Our proposed 
approach, by contrast, collects data at the level of beneficiaries and can therefore control for 
differences in X. 
  
In summary, estimating the TPE on the basis of group averages from RCTs becomes 
problematic when β and P are correlated as a result of targeting on the basis of unobservables. If 
one randomizes at the level of beneficiaries the TPE estimator will be biased because the 
correlation is not taken into account. If one randomizes at the level of program officers the 
estimator is inefficient and, if confounders are important, may become useless.         
 
6. An Empirical Example: Estimating the Total Program Effect for a Rural Water Supply 
Program in Mozambique 
 
In this section we illustrate the estimation of the TPE with a relatively simple example based on 
an evaluation of the ‘One Million Initiative’ in Mozambique.18  
The Initiative aims to give one million people in rural areas access to clean drinking water and 
adequate sanitation by constructing new water points and providing a particular type of 
sanitation training (CLTS). Elbers et al. (2012) use panel survey data for 1600 households to 
analyze the health impact of this program. The survey data were collected in two rounds, in 
2008 and 2010, in 80 communities. There are four groups of communities: those without any 
intervention, those with only a water intervention or only a sanitation intervention and those 
                                                 
18 Since the purpose is simply to illustrate the method we restrict the example to the specification of section 3, i.e. 
we do not consider the case of section 4 where X  has an effect on P. Elbers et al. (2012) describe the Initiative. 
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with both types of interventions. Since the interventions were targeted on poorer communities 
there are significant differences between the baseline characteristics of these four groups.   
Elbers et al. (2012) used the survey data for a double difference regression shown in the first 
column in Table 1. Health status was measured by a dummy variable indicating whether any 
household member was affected by water-borne diseases in the 6 months preceding the 
interview.19 Whether there was a water point or sanitation intervention in the household’s cluster 
(location) is measured by dummy variables. Since switching to a new, improved water point is 
attractive only if the new source is close, the water point intervention dummy is interacted with 
the distance between the household’s location and the improved water source.  Controls are 
household size and wealth and the number of under-5 children. The results suggest a substantial 
and significant effect of sanitation training: it reduces the probability of being affected by 8 
percentage points and accounts for 20% of the decline between the two survey rounds.20 While 
the effect of sanitation training is strong, access to improved water sources has no significant 
effect on health. This is not really surprising since the water is often not safe at the source (even 
for ‘improved’ water sources) and there is considerable contamination of water with fecal 
(thermo-tolerant) bacteria between the source and the point of use, a common finding in WASH 
studies.      
 
In the second regression in Table 1 we include all the interaction terms suggested by 
equation (5). 21  In the augmented regression the additional terms are not significant, either 
individually or jointly (with the single exception of the interaction of distance to the new water 
point and household size which is marginally significant: p = 0.09).  The coefficient of the 
sanitation intervention is considerably larger in absolute terms than in the original regression, 
                                                 
19 By construction the health indicator is sensitive to household size. This variable is therefore included as a control.  
20 The autonomous decline of 12 percentage points is difficult to explain. It may reflect different weather conditions 
or differences in methods of enumerators  in the two rounds. 
21 Note that some of the interactions do not introduce a new variable since the square of a binary variable is 
proportional to the binary variable itself. 
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but this is compensated by the coefficients on the interaction terms involving the sanitation 
intervention. 
 
Table 1. Determinants of water-related diseases  
Mozambique, 2008-2010 
Dependent variable: Change in disease prevalence at household level, 6 months recall 
Minimal regression Augmented regression 
Estimate Std. Error Estimate Std. Error 
Constant (trend) -0.119*** 0.030 -0.107*** 0.032 
water point intervention (wpi) 0.004 0.053 0.035 0.095 
sanitation intervention (si) -0.082* 0.042 -0.172*** 0.050 
household size (hhs)  0.027*** 0.008 0.015 0.012 
number of children under-5 (ch) 0.030 0.020 0.054* 0.027 
wealth (w) -0.023 0.031 -0.028 0.047 
interaction wpi * distance to 
water point (wd) -0.020 0.061 -0.309 0.248 
interaction wpi * si 0.116 0.101 
wd squared 0.176 0.129 
interaction wd * si 0.059 0.092 
interaction wpi * hhs -0.002 0.024 
interaction wd * hhs 0.031* 0.018 
interaction si * hhs 0.010 0.018 
interaction wpi * ch -0.028 0.074 
interaction wd * ch -0.030 0.057 
interaction si * ch -0.004 0.052 
interaction wpi * w -0.023 0.087 
interaction wd * w  0.011 0.095 
interaction si * w  0.028 0.075 
Adjusted R2  0.023 0.023 
Significance codes:   '***' 0.01 '**' 0.05 ‘*’ 0.1 
n= 1279, mean dependent variable = -0.163 
Household fixed effects regression. Clustered standard errors
 
Equation (6) can be used to estimate the total program effect. Table 2 summarizes the results.22 
 
                                                 
22 In this illustrative example observations have not been reweighted to undo overrepresentation of poor households 
in the sample. Table 2 therefore contains TPE estimates for a population that looks like the sample. 
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Table 2 Total Program Effect of the One Million Initiative 
 
 Augmented Regression 
 
Original Regression 
TPE 
(Standard error) 
-0.050** 
(0.023) 
-0.033 
(0.023) 
   
Standard errors corrected for clustering. 
 
The first column in the Table is based on equation (6). The estimated TPE indicates that of the 
16 percentage points decline in disease prevalence over the two year interval 5 percentage points 
can be attributed to the program. For comparison, the TPE is also calculated on the basis of the 
first regression equation in Table 1. Using this regression the TPE is smaller (in absolute value) 
and not significant. Since the extra coefficients in the augmented equation are not jointly 
significant there is no strong reason to prefer one estimate over the other. A reason to prefer the 
augmented regression is that it allows for heterogeneity.23 However, it should be noted that the 
two TPE-estimates are within each other’s confidence intervals. Obviously, a final choice of 
specification would require more detailed diagnostic tests and simulations, which is beyond the 
scope of the present paper.  
The Mozambique example shows how the TPE can be calculated, allowing for treatment 
heterogeneity. While in this case it is not clear that treatment heterogeneity is important, in other 
contexts it may well be. We would advise to calculate the TPE in both ways, as in Table 2, and 
to test whether the difference between the estimates is significant.  
  
                                                 
23 An argument favoring the augmented regression would be the more flexible functional form in combination with 
the large number of observations. For instance, Miller (2002) concludes that “…using all the available predictors 
will often yield predictions with a smaller MSEP [mean square error of prediction – authors] than any subset [of 
predictors].” 
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7.  Conclusion 
 
Policy makers in developing countries, NGOs and donor agencies are under increasing pressure 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of their program activities. At the same time there is a growing 
interest in using randomized controlled trials (RCTs) for impact evaluation of projects. This 
raises the question to what extent RCTs can be used to evaluate programs, for instance by 
aggregating the impact of the components of the program. This question is particularly relevant 
for the evaluation of budget support which is used to finance a wide variety of different 
activities. 
 
The strength of RCTs is in establishing proof of principle. Going further and using RCTs to 
estimate the impact of programs is possible in special cases but becomes problematic if the 
probability of assignment is correlated with the effectiveness of the intervention, for example if 
teachers tend to give more attention to pupils who in their perception can benefit more from it. 
An RCT which randomizes at the level of beneficiaries would produce a biased estimate of the 
program effect since such a correlation between assignment and treatment effects would not be 
taken into account. Alternatively, if one randomizes at a higher level (“program officers”) then 
the estimator is inefficient and, if confounders are important and correlated with characteristics 
of the program officers, it could be severely biased.         
 
The approach proposed in this paper requires observational panel data for a representative 
sample of beneficiaries  rather than experimental data for randomly selected treatment and 
control groups. If treatment is exogenous this will correctly reflect the assignment process even 
under treatment heterogeneity. Instead of estimating average impact coefficients for each of the 
various interventions of the program, we estimate the expected value (across beneficiaries) of 
 18 
 
the total impact of the combined interventions. This parameter we have termed the total program 
effect (TPE). We have shown how and under what conditions regression techniques can be used 
to estimate the TPE in the presence of selection effects.  As an example we presented TPE 
estimates for a rural water and sanitation program in Mozambique. 
 
The approach has three advantages. First, by using observational data for a random sample from 
the population of intended beneficiaries external validity is ensured (except for general 
equilibrium effects). While the disadvantages of observational data are well known, this is an 
important advantage. Secondly, by focusing on the combined effect of program components the 
components are automatically correctly weighted. Finally, it avoids the problems which RCTs 
encounter when (as is plausible in development programs) assignment is imperfectly controlled 
and correlated with unobservables.    
 19 
 
References 
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Duflo (2009), ‘The Experimental Approach to Development 
Economics’, Annual Review of Economics, vol. 1, pp. 151-178.  
 
Bracht, Glenn H. and Glass, Gene V. (1968), ‘The External Validity of Experiments’, American 
Education Research Journal, vol. 5, pp. 437-474. 
 
Chen, Shaohua, Ren Mu, and Martin Ravallion (2009), ‘Are There Lasting Impacts of Aid to 
Poor Areas?’, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 93, pp. 512-528. 
 
Das, Jishnu, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana, Pramila Krishnan (2004), ‘When Can School 
Inputs Improve Test Scores?’, Policy Research Working Paper, World Bank. 
 
Das, Jishnu, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana, Pramila Krishnan (2007), ‘Teacher Shocks and 
Student Learning: Evidence from Zambia’, Journal of Human Resources, vol. 42, pp. 820-862.  
 
Deaton, Angus (2010), ‘Instruments, Randomization, and Learning about Development’, 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 28, pp. 424-455. 
 
De Kemp, Anthonie, Jörg Faust and Stefan Leiderer (2011), Between High Expectations and 
Reality: an Evaluation of Budget Support in Zambia, Bonn/The Hague/ Stockholm: 
BMZ/Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Sida. 
 
Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster and Michael Kremer (2008), ‘Using Randomization in 
Development Economics Research: a Toolkit’, in T. Paul Schultz and John Strauss (eds.), 
Handbook of Development Economics, Amsterdam: North-Holland, pp. 3895-3962. 
 
Elbers, Chris and Jan Willem Gunning (2009), ‘Evaluation of Development Policy: Treatment 
versus Program Effects’, Tinbergen Institution Discussion Paper 2009-073/2. 
 
Elbers, Chris, Jan Willem Gunning and Kobus de Hoop (2009), ‘Assessing Sector-Wide 
Programs with Statistical Impact Evaluation: a Methodological Proposal’, World Development, 
vol. 37, 2009, pp. 513-520. 
 
Elbers, Chris, Samuel Godfrey, Jan Willem Gunning, Matteus van der Velden and Melinda Vigh 
(2012), ‘Effectiveness of Large Scale Water and Sanitation Interventions: the One Million 
Initiative in Mozambique’, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 2012-069/2.  
 
Heckman, James J., Sergio Urzua and Edward J. Vytlacil (2008), ‘Understanding Instrumental 
Variables with Essential Heterogeneity’, Review of Economics and Statistics, vol. 88, pp. 389-
432. 
 
Heckman James J. (1997), ‘Instrumental Variables: a Study of Implicit Behavioral Assumptions 
Used in Making Program Evaluations’,  Journal of Human Resources, vol. 32, pp. 441-462. 
 
Imbens, Guido W. and Joshua D. Angrist (1994), ‘Identification and Estimation of Local 
Average Treatment Effects’, Econometrica, vol. 62, pp. 467-476. 
 
Ravallion, Martin (2009), ‘Evaluation in the Practice of Development’, World Bank Research 
Observer, vol. 24, pp. 29-53. 
 20 
 
 
Ravallion, Martin (2012), ‘Fighting Poverty One Experiment at a Time: a Review of Abhijit 
Banerjee and Esther Duflo’s Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global 
Poverty’, Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 50, pp. 103-114. 
 
Rodrik, Dani (2008), ‘The New Development Economics: We Shall Experiment But How Shall 
We Learn?’, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, HKS Working Paper 
RWP 08-055. 
 
White, Howard (2006), Impact Evaluation: the Experience of the Independent Evaluation Group 
of the World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 21 
 
 
 
  Supplemental Material 
Precision of TPE estimators when treatment is exogenous but not fully 
controlled24 
 
Using RCTs 
 “Program Officers” (POs) are divided into treatment- and control-POs. All subjects within the 
catchment area of a treatment-PO are considered as treated (i.e., we want to estimate the 
intention to treat effect). 
 
Consider the following model linking outcome ijy to (actual) treatment ijP : 
 ,ij i ij ij ijy P      
where i refers to the program officer responsible for administrating treatment to subject j who 
falls within the catchment area of i .  The disturbance ij is assumed to be homoscedastic and 
independent of ,i ij   and ijP . To model clustering by POs an officer random effect i  is 
included in the model. Random effects are assumed to be i.i.d. and independent of ij  and ijP . 
We further assume that the number of subjects per PO is constant to avoid trivial complications 
of weighing. 
 
The evaluator wants to estimate TPE ij ijE P and in order to capture any selectivity in 
application of treatment by the program officers (PO) a random sample of POs has been drawn 
and subsequently been randomly divided into a group T  of treatment-POs who are supposed to 
apply treatment to the ultimate beneficiaries j  and a group C of control-POs who are asked not 
to give treatment to subjects. Within the catchment area of sampled POs a random sample of 
                                                 
24 The context is that of section 5 in the main text of the paper.  
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subjects is drawn for whom we observe (at least) ijy . This allows estimation of the TPE as the 
difference in average outcomes between group T  and group C  subjects: hat over TPE? 
 ˆ [ ] ,T C T C ij ij T CTTPE y y P            (A.1) 
where the bars denote sample averages over the two groups of subjects. Since this estimator is 
unbiased, its precision can be determined by the variance: 
 2 21 1 1 1 1ˆMSE( ) [var( )] ( )ij ij T
T C T T C
TPE P
n n N N N 
            
where Tn  and Cn  denote the number of sampled treatment-POs and control-POs, TN  the total 
number of sampled subjects associated with treatment-POs, and CN  the number of sampled 
subjects falling under control-POs. 
 
Regression using observational data 
Now consider sampling directly at the level of subjects. Typically such a sample will also be 
clustered, albeit not necessarily by PO. To create a ‘level playing field’ we will assume that the 
sample has T Cn n n   clusters with a total of T CN N N   subjects. For each sampled subject
j  from cluster i  we observe ijP  (actual treatment) and ijy . The estimator for the TPE reduces 
to 
 
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )ˆ .
1 1 1
ij ij i ij ij ij
ij ij i ij
ij ij ij
y P P P
TPE y P
P P P
               (A.2) 
Assuming as in the RCT setup that i  is independent of ijP  and ij this estimator is again 
unbiased25 and 
 
(1 ) (1 )1ˆMSE( ) var( ) var var
1 1
i ij ij ij
ij ij i ij
ij ij
P P
TPE P
N P P
                     
. 
                                                 
25 Correlation of i  and ,ij ijP  would reflect level effects which, as explained in section 2, should be neutralized 
by using differenced data. 
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Using the delta method and the equality 2
1( ) (1 )ij ij
NE P P EP EP
N
    it can be verified that26  
  
  
  
 2
1 ( )
(1 ) 1var var ,
11 1 1
ij ij ij
ij ij ij ij
ij
ij ij ij
P P
P PN
NP P P 
 
                 

 
and likewise that  
 
 2
1 ( )
(1 ) 1var var .
11 1 1
i ij
i ij ij ij
i
ij ij ij
P P
P PN
NP P P 
 
                 

 
It follows that in the regression setup precision is of order N while in the RCT setup precision 
if at best of order / 2TN  and, if clustering of data is an issue, of order / 2Tn . (Note that if 
the two groups are of equal size: NT = N/2, then the regression setup is twice as precise as the 
RCT setup.) 
 
Covariates 
Both methods fail if   and P  are correlated. What if there are observables ijX  determining 
both P  and y ? This could be the result of program targeting. In that case formulas (A.1) and 
(A.2) can no longer be used. To account for the confounding effect of covariates a regression 
approach is required, also with an RCT setup. For RCTs using intention to treat by PO for 
estimating the TPE, efficient estimation would amount to a regression equation like 
 { }TPE .ij i i T ij ijy I X       
The reason formula (A.1) can no longer be used is that randomization over POs does not 
guarantee randomization over observables ijx . Applying formula (A.1) we would find 
 ˆ ( ) [ ] .T CT C T C ij ij T CTTPE y y X X P               
                                                 
26 In this case E denotes an average over all possible samples. 
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The bias ( )T CX X   would vanish if T CX X , i.e., when ijX  and { }.i TI   are uncorrelated. 
 
 
